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Introduction
In general medicine, and much more in the treatment of psychiatric illness, one size does
not fit all. Expansive breakthroughs in science and medicine have given scientists insight into the
biological causes of diseases and disorders heretofore unimaginable until the past several years.
Moreover, the field of neuroscience has begun to unravel the complicated networking systems of
the human brain, and scientists are slowly beginning to comprehend how humans process the
world around them. This has allowed for personalized treatment and improved results in physical
health. But what of emotional and mental health? The focus of this review is to call for the
integration of neuroscience and translational research in psychopathology, a field concerned with
the malfunctioning of those processes. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), a project
launched by the National Institute of Mental Health in 2009, is the basis for this literature review,
due to its transdiagnostic nature and focus on integrating neuroscience into mental health
research and treatment. The limitations of the current classification system of mental disorders
will be reviewed in chapter 1, followed by an overview of the RDoC format. Chapters 2 and 3
will cover genetic and neuroscientific research, including the concept of endophenotypes which
the RDoC matrix is structured upon, and chapter 4 will focus on the reward system and its
abnormal functioning in substance use disorder (also known as addiction).
In attempts to move past using specific DSM diagnoses, it may seem counterintuitive to
focus on one particular disorder, such as substance use disorder. However, substance use
disorder can be especially useful as a template for a transdiagnostic mechanism when studying
the underlying biology of psychopathology. Substance use disorder is frequently co-diagnosed
with other mental disorders. Statistically, according to the US Department of Health and Human
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Services, 41-65% of those suffering from a lifetime substance use disorder also have a history of
at least one serious mental illness, and 50% of those with a lifetime serious mental illness also
have a history of at least one substance use disorder (Perron, Bunger, Bender, Vaughn, &
Howard, 2010, p. 1263).
Moreover, substance use passes through several stages of differing patterns of behaviors,
employing different neural circuits, affective states, cognitive functions, and behavior patterns.
The “downward spiral” of the addiction cycle can actually mimic different disorders as it
progresses through these various stages, which allows researchers specific targets for research
during this process (Everitt, Belin, Economidou, Pelloux, Dalley, & Robbins, 2008). For
example, the competing processes of what the addict “wants” vs. “does” (self-reported desire to
stop yet the inability to do so) provides researchers a dense subject matter of neurological
dysfunction. By focusing on the underlying circuitry involved, rather than on the illness itself,
substance use disorder casts a wide net when searching for dysfunctional processing of neural
circuits.
It is time to redefine the understanding of mental disorders, and change the ways of
research and treating them. The current literature review seeks to illumine this new approach in
psychopathology.
Chapter 1- Classification System
In his State of the Union address in 2015, President Obama proclaimed the new Precision
Medicine Initiative (PMI), a dramatic shift in healthcare and medicinal research that will be
centered on the patient rather than the disease. Far too many diseases go untreated, or
ineffectively treated, because of a lack of understanding of their underlying biology. This new
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initiative seeks to change that. The goal of the PMI is to incorporate a patient’s genetic and
environmental information, as well as the molecular manifestations of a disease, into treatment
efforts. The $215 million investment in the PMI will aid researchers in discovering biomedical
innovations for prevention, treatment, and even cures for medical diseases and conditions. Rather
than focusing efforts toward the “average patient” of a specific diagnosis, the goal is to clarify
specific illnesses and target interventions for treating and preventing them.
With an increased comprehension of the biological underpinnings of diseases, scientists
can help improve the health of millions of people by using a more clear-cut approach to
treatment as well as improving prevention efforts. The PMI uses an interdisciplinary approach
ranging from genomics, epigenomics, proteomics, and bioinformatics, so clinicians will be able
to specify not just what disease a patient has, but what type of that disease and how it is uniquely
manifested in their specific condition. Moreover, due to large-scale data collection, a prominent
factor of the PMI, scientists will have a more complete knowledge network of the molecular and
genetic causes and risks for heritable and infectious diseases.
Great strides have already been made with this initiative for some medical conditions
such as cancer. Distinct types of genomic signatures for several types of cancers have already
been discovered because of this approach (Collins & Varmus, 2015, p. 794). Improved research
efforts toward molecular diagnoses will continue to address certain problems in precision
oncology, such as unexplained drug resistance and genetic variances between tumors.
The PMI is possible because of vast technological and scientific progress in recent years.
Due to continuous breakthroughs in fields like molecular, cellular, and systems neuroscience,
there is an ever-increasing understanding of the human body and its inner workings (for further
review see Insel & Landis, 2013).
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In just one example, the National Institute of Health has seen incredible developments in
this area by funding the Human Connectome Project (HCP), an effort that has set out to map the
brain’s neurological wiring in its entirety (Van Essen et al., 2012). Until now, neuroscientists
have only been able to infer conclusions based on studying different areas of the brain. The HCP,
however, will collect data and images from the brain as a whole. This is a fundamental paradigm
shift toward understanding mental processing, especially related to complex disorders such as
schizophrenia, substance use disorder, and bipolar disorder. Researchers involved in the project
are optimistic about the use of the project’s data, believing that the benefits resulting from the
HCP will include: more precise charting of brain parcellations, brain networks, and their
dynamics; improved specificity of measurement of individual brain network variation; and
increased understanding of the relationship between phenotypes and neural networks (Van Essen
et al., 2013, p.77). The advantages of the clinical utility of this type of data are self-explanatory,
and researchers are understandably very hopeful.
Sadly, the progress for the treatment of mental disorders is far less impressive.
Neuropsychiatric illness is the leading cause of disease burden in the developed world, and is the
largest source of years lived with disability; furthermore, mental illness is highly correlated with
suicide--rates are over 38,000 per year in the US--and most of those involved a mental disorder
(Insel & Landis, 2013, p. 563). The societal burden is substantial as well, in 2010 the cost of lost
earnings due to psychiatric illness was estimated to be $200 billion per year (Akil et al., 2010, p
1580). Moreover, treatment advances in this field are sorely lacking. There have been no
significant breakthroughs in treatments for schizophrenia in over 50 years, and none for
treatment of depression in the last 20 years (Akil et. al, 2010, p. 1580).
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The method of diagnosis for mental disorders is the clinical observation of symptoms.
Currently, clinicians rely on categories of clustered signs and symptoms to diagnose and treat
mental disorders. The NIMH challenges this approach by highlighting the lack of neurologicallybased criteria as the reason for the gap in progress in this field, compared with the improvements
seen in the medical health profession (Pemberton & Wainwright, 2014, p. 218). In other words,
we are relying on outdated observational methods when the expanse of neuroscience has given
us new and exciting insight into brain functioning.
Scientists have recognized for some time that psychological disorders are not just
behavioral problems, but involve dysfunction in the brain. What we are seeing now, however, is
that these disorders are not limited to one site in the brain, but involve many areas. Psychiatric
disorders, then, would be better thought of as “brain circuit problems”—what researchers have
called ‘connectopathies’, rather than straight neurological disorders that damage a specific part
of the brain (Collin, Turk, van den Heuvel, 2016, p. 1). These circuits can be identified using the
new technological developments of functional imaging.
Yet, even with all the excitement surrounding methods for viewing brain connections in
vivo, as well as advances in electrophysiology and functional neuroimaging, skepticism abounds.
Many psychologists fear that clinicians will be swept away by biological approaches, restricting
their ability (or willingness) to include psychological, behavioral and social dimensions of a
disorder. Proponents of the biopsychosocial model argue that, despite proclamations of coming
closer to significant treatments for mental disorders, the biomedical model has produced little
progress toward this end. In fact, while cases of patients suffering from mental disorders have
increased, cures seem just as far off as they did decades ago; citing lobotomies, electroconvulsive
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therapy, and insula coma treatments, many critics think the disease model of mental disorders
has caused more harm than good (Deacon, 2013, p. 848).
Some critics go so far as to reject the notion of mental illness altogether, such as Thomas
Szasz, a vehement opponent of psychiatry despite being a psychiatrist himself. Szasz claimed
that mental disorders were not real because illness requires the presence of a physical lesion, and
since the mind is not an organ, it cannot be afflicted in such a way (Vatz & Schaler, 2008, p. 60).
Thus, he argued mental disorders were “metaphors” and “problems of living” rather than medical
conditions; furthermore, he criticized psychiatry’s view of symptoms as the disease, rather than a
sign of disease (Vatz & Schaler, 2008, p. 58, 60). He also thought that mental health diagnoses
were a form of social control, to impose moral values and/or attempt to mitigate responsibility
from those who were guilty of criminal behavior.
Though Szasz’s theories are misguided, mainly due to his anachronistic belief in
mind/body dualism, there is a point he makes that must not be overlooked. Essentially, Szasz
was not belittling the suffering experienced by individuals with these illnesses, nor was he
invalidating the empirical evidence of symptoms; rather he was suggesting that until biological
etiology could be accounted for, clinicians were grasping at classifications based solely on
symptoms. Szasz maintained that when these biological causes were discovered, they would not
reveal disorders of the mind—but disorders of the brain. This is an important distinction, and has
since been recognized by many clinicians and researchers alike.
Take schizophrenia, for example. Many decades ago, physicians viewed schizophrenia as
a disorder of the mind, with no discernable physical abnormalities (Aftab, 2014, p. 20). Thanks
to neuroscience, however, scientists are now aware of many abnormalities in the brain that
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underlie this disorder; including, but not limited to, impaired synaptic connectivity, decreased
cortical volume and thickness, and compromised neuronal and axonal integrity (Darrick &
Joseph, 2011). Further, disturbances in the dopaminergic and glutamatergic neurotransmitter
systems have been detected (Falkai, 2012). Nevertheless, the vast complexity of this disorder
leaves the discovery of a specific biological cause well outside the grasp of current
understanding. It is the opinion of most scientists that different discoveries about this disorder
should not be regarded as mutually exclusive, but that each could provide further insight into the
connectivity of neural circuits and the impact of many biological factors present in one disorder.
The limitations of the present diagnostic criteria prevents expanded research into this
disorder, mainly because of the nature of criteria necessary for schizophrenia diagnoses. The
functional and chronological criteria is unclear and applied very inconsistently (Maj, 1998, p.
459). Moreover, the symptomatological criteria confuses the heterogeneity of symptoms of
schizophrenia because several schizophrenic symptoms can also be found in major depressive
disorder, mania, and dementia (Maj, 2011, p. 21). Due to these complications, scientists are
beginning to suggest the redirection of research attention; perhaps the focus should be towards
organic causes of symptomatology, rather than starting with rigid disorder categories.
Current diagnoses stem from the highly relied up Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (ICD). The DSM and ICD have been incredibly useful and widely respected,
but they are not without their flaws. These tools were designed to provide a consensus on what
constitutes a mental disorder with common language and standards that could be used by
clinicians, researchers, health and pharmaceutical companies, etc. This focus on inter-rater
reliability was well-intentioned, but many argue that high reliability should not be a substitute for
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validity (Hagan & Guilmette, 2015, p. 2). In other words, the agreement between scientists as to
what constitutes a mental disorder is a veneer of actual scientific legitimacy, as majority
agreement does nothing to get us closer to actually understanding these disorders.
As medicine and scientific research have progressed, DSM/ICD revisions have been
made, yet they still garner hefty criticism and controversy. Among these criticisms are the lack
of biological validity, the superficial reliance on subjective observation and self-reports, and the
lack of validity of the diagnostic categories themselves; furthermore, many of these diagnostic
categories arbitrarily define disorders and ignores the overlapping symptoms between them,
which leads to an overabundance of co-morbid diagnoses (Lilienfeld, 2014).
The latest revision of the diagnostic manual, the DSM-5, does attempt to incorporate
biological findings in its assessment of mental disorders, highlighting validators such as genetic
traits, similar neural substrates, and possible biomarkers, yet the emphasis is still focused on
clinical usefulness among clinicians rather than successful treatment options for individual
patients (Hofman, 2014, p. 578). Even the switch from roman numerals to the decimal system
reflects an openness to allow for revisions when new empirical evidence become available
(Wakefield, 2013, p. 140). However, this new addition of biological component did not prevent
vehement scrutiny and denigration. First among the concerns is the discontinuation of the
multiaxial system found in previous DSM editions, most notably eradication of Axels IV and V
(Raines, 2014, p.2). These Axels addressed the psychosocial and environmental factors that
contribute to or cause mental disorders, and the strengths of the individual being diagnosed,
respectively (Raines, 2014, p.2). The inclusion of biological factors is a step in the right direction
for the DSM-5, but swinging the pendulum so far towards only the biological side of these
disorders leaves no room for the psychosocial factors that contribute to their complexity. By
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narrowing the criteria to focus solely on biological factors, the DSM-5 misses the mark for
adequately understanding the nature of mental disorders. There have been no single biological
causes identified in psychiatric disorders, so the elimination of possible environmental factors in
diagnosis is premature at best, and irresponsible and misleading at worst.
Other controversy was stirred by the inclusion of several more disorders to the DSM-5
manual. Of the 94 suggestions of new diagnostic categories, the DSM-IV added only two; yet the
DSM-5 has added several more diagnoses such as grief disorder and somatic symptom disorder,
and further blurred the lines of existing diagnostic categories by loosening criteria for certain
disorders like the already overused diagnosis of adult ADHD (Frances, 2013, p 221.). Critics
worry that this will lead to an inflation of assumed prevalence of mental disorders in the general
population, and lead to a “medicalization of normal human distress” that is only beneficial for
pharmaceutical companies looking to recruit more pharmacological customers (Kinderman,
Read, Moncrieff & Bentall, 2013, p. 2). Also among the concerns is the apparent reduction in
reliability estimates from DSM-5 field trials, which suggest that “reliability of psychological
diagnosis may be lower than commonly believed” (Chmielewski, Clark, Bagby, & Watson,
2015, p. 768). Allen Frances, professor at Duke University and previous chairman of the DSMIV task force, points out that previous editions of the DSM required a disorder to show a
significant kappa reliability of about .6 to be considered acceptable; the DSM-5 allowed for a
kappa as low as .2 in some cases (Chimielewski et al., 2015, p. 765).
In contrast, the RDoC is a formative new way of studying mental disorders. The RDoC
aims to be a biologically- valid, neuroscientifically- informed framework for understanding
mental disorders. Because behavioral symptoms are multidetermined, diagnoses based on
presenting complaints are unavoidably heterogeneous in terms of pathophysiology (Insel, 2014).
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Therefore, the NIMH has conceptualized a way to incorporate neuroscience and genomics into
current research methods and clinical observations to ultimately help inform a better way of
classifying mental disorders in the future (Insel et al., 2010, p. 748).
The RDoC urges scientists to study “fundamental biobehavioral dimensions that cut
across heterogeneous disorder categories…from genes to circuits to clinical behavior”
(Østergaard, 2014, p. 409). Advances in DNA sequencing and neuroimaging can give us new
insight into psychological disorders not yet seen in medical and clinical practice. This new
integrated approach is able to cover the entire spectrum of human functioning, rather than being
limited to a diagnostic category. So many mechanisms are at play in mental disorders, many of
which are still poorly understood at a basic level, much less at the level of complexity seen in
psychopathology. Many disorders share the same symptoms, and many symptoms vary wildly
within the range of each diagnostic category.
The RDoC project was created as a possible solution to the predicaments encountered by
the current nosological system. The NIMH Strategic Plan 1.4 states the Institute’s goal is to,
“develop, for research purposes, new ways of classifying mental disorders based on dimensions
of observable behavior and neurobiological measures” (Casey, Craddock, Cuthbert, Hyman, Lee
& Ressler, 2013, p. 812). Moreover, the RDoC seeks to study the complete spectrum of
functioning, from normal to pathological (Casey, et. al, 2013, p. 812). Critics of the nature of the
“well” versus “ill” concept of the DSM will rejoice over the inclusion of a spectrum for mental
disorders, such as those seen in diabetes and hypertension; this concept was also most recently
applied to autism, the first real revision in the right direction for the DSM.
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The NIMH stresses the notion of the RDoC as a framework for research, rather than a
replacement of the DSM/ICD diagnostic tools. The ultimate goal is toward a new classification
system, or perhaps just an improvement of the old one, but that is way down the line. Rather, the
RDoC will attempt to move psychiatry forward by examining what the brain actually does, then
seek to determine malfunctions within those systems. Beginning with the neural circuitry of the
brain in healthy function, researchers will be able to better map out what goes wrong in an entire
network of the brain instead of just one or two areas. This is no small feat, and the NIMH is well
aware of the tremendous workload that awaits this new approach. Nevertheless, the
disentanglement of intricate circuitry within the brain could be the most promising revolution in
both psychology and mental health science has seen yet.
The RDoC created a matrix to use as framework for research. This grid is comprised of
rows that contain domains and constructs, and columns which specify units of analysis. The
research is blind to diagnostic categories; rather, the heuristic is guided by current knowledge
about neural circuits and their associated genes, molecules, physiological signals, and behaviors
as well as by gaps in that knowledge (Morris, Rumsey, & Cuthbert, 2014, p. 9). The five
domains include: negative valence systems (fear, anxiety, loss), positive valence systems (reward
learning, reward valuation), cognitive systems (attention, perception, working memory, cognitive
control), systems for social processes (attachment formation, social communication, perception
of self, perception of others), and arousal/modulatory systems (arousal, circadian rhythm, sleep
and wakefulness; Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016, p. 289). The constructs within these domains were
decided upon through workshops where experts were consulted to discover what similar systems
are known about that cut across many disorders.
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These domains will be studied by seven different units of analysis. These units include:
genes, molecules, cells, circuits, physiology, behavior and self-reports; also included will be a
unit of analysis titled “paradigms”, which will include different lab tasks used to study these
constructs (Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016, p. 289). Contrary to some concern, one can see the
inclusion of behavior and self-reports do not narrow the focus of the RDoC to biology alone.
Instead, the goal is to provide a comprehensive understanding of both phenomena, which are
neither exclusively biological nor psychological, thus resulting in more dynamic and compelling
theories in the end (Cuthbert & Kozack, 2013, p. 931). The focus on brain-behavior relations
incipiently, then connecting them to clinical phenomena, is a revolutionary way to study these
brain disorders.
The opponents to the RDoC and reappraisal of mental disorders as brain disorders are
numerous, many citing that there is no scientific basis for such a claim (McLaren, 2013).
However, if human processing occurs in the brain, then it would behoove every scientist to know
more about the organ of interest. This is the basic reasoning behind the call for neuroscience to
inform the arena of clinical practice. Indeed, this concept is the very foundation of translational
research.
Translational research is defined as “the transfer of knowledge gained from basic
research to new and improved methods of preventing, diagnosing, or treating disease” (Hall,
2002 p. 235). In many other areas of medicine, the approach of studying the genetic, cellular, and
molecular aspects of diseases has led to increasingly more specific and efficac ious treatment
options. The interdisciplinary fields in academia also reflect the recognition of the paradigm shift
toward translational medicine and research. Areas such as behavioral neuroscience, biological
psychology, neurophysiology, and other programs are designed to integrate the disciplines of the
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life and physical sciences, mathematics, engineering, psychology, and medicine. Some
universities have developed programs to span the breadth of these disciplines to prepare students
for a career in translational research.
This need for collaboration among disciplines is not meant to imply that the work done
by basic research or clinical practice alone are thus far are without merit. However, this benchto-bedside approach will enable scientists to bridge the gaps that single disciplinary research has
left in the field. We are in need of scientists that are willing to venture beyond their “comfort
zones” in terms of their areas of expertise and embrace insights discovered outside of these
domains (Chiccetti & Toth, 2006, p. 621).
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Chapter 2- Genetics

The latter part of the 20th century began a shift, with new discoveries in molecular
biology leading to increased knowledge of the structure and function of DNA. The completion of
the human genome in 2003 was a huge step toward a new understanding of human biology. With
greater understanding of human functioning at the genetic, molecular, and cellular level, came a
realization that dysfunction occurs at these levels as well. Psychiatric disorders are no longer
thought to be simply behavioral or environmental, as once assumed, but have biological
components that must be included in our overall understanding of psychopathology.
Though trait inheritance was speculated and assumed long before the technology to study
it was created, the scientific discipline of genetics was founded by the late 19 th -century scientist,
Gregor Mendel, who used pea pods to test his theory that organisms pass down certain traits to
their offspring (Garlick, 2006, p. 53). Mendel’s pioneering work set the stage for much of what
geneticists still do today, investigating trait and molecular inheritance passed down through
family lines. It is now established that every human child inherits half of their genes from their
father, the other half from their mother, resulting in specific traits that are expressed. Some of
these are physical, such as hair and eye color, and many other traits have been found to be
genetic as well, such as personality traits, behaviors, and risk for certain diseases (Vukasović &
Bratko, 2015, p. 780; Adams et al, 2015, p 12,81).
The field of genetics led to large discoveries for disease etiology. Many diseases, such as
Rett’s syndrome, cystic fibrosis, and sickle-cell anemia, were found to be caused by mutations in
a single gene (Chial, 2008, p. 192). These disease are appropriately termed “Mendelian”, or
single- gene, disorders. Unfortunately, most diseases were found to be much more complex. The
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term “polygenic” is used to describe disorders with at least two (but usually many more) genes
that work together to influence phenotypic (observable) expression. The task of geneticists
dealing with the etiology of these types of disorders, including psychiatric disorders, was now to
differentiate between what portions of the disorder were due to the genotype (the information
carried in an individual’s genes) and what portions were due to other factors. This is the reason
scientists are often interested in the heritability estimate of each disorder.
Heritability is the ratio of variation due to differences between genotypes and the total
phenotypic variation for a characteristic or trait in a population (For a full review, see Urbanoski
& Kelly, 2012). Heritability estimates determine how strongly a characteristic is shared in a
family by evaluating the prevalence rate of that characteristic among family members, so that the
percentage rate of that characteristic shared among family members can be attributed to
biological factors (Garrett, 2015, p. 112). Consequently, it has been well-established that mental
disorders aggregate in families, with high heritability estimates for schizophrenia (.80-.84),
bipolar disorder (.60-.70), autism (.90) and moderate estimates for all anxiety disorders (.30-.40)
and major depression (.28-.40) (Merikangas & Risch, 2003, p.626).
Another way to research heritability is by comparing twins and adoptees. Adoption
studies compare the similarities between children and their biological parents (heredity) and their
adoptive parents (environment), whereas twin studies compare the similarities between identical
(monozygotic) and fraternal (dizygotic) twins (Garrett, 2015, p. 113). Twin studies are able to be
more specific when determining genetic factors because monozygotic twins share 100% of their
genetic material, while dizygotic twins share 50%. The studies comparing twins and biological
children reared apart from their parents such as in adoption studies, are very beneficial for
genetic research because they allow scientists to separate genetic and environmental factors.
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Results from twin and adoption studies have shown that substance abuse disorders are highly
heritable, with alcohol abuse heritability estimates ranging from .50 to .60, and estimates from
.30 to .80 for other substances; moreover, first-degree relatives of individuals with a substance
abuse disorder show a 4-8 fold increase in the risk of those relatives developing the disorder
themselves (Urbanoski & Kelly, 2012, p.61).
Unfortunately, high heritability estimates like these are somewhat misleading. Though
discovering the heritability of psychological and behavioral traits was helpful in determining a
genetic element to these traits (as opposed to a strictly environmental causality, as was once the
primary assumption), it does little to explain their origin or explain their pathology in
individuals. One reason is because heritability estimates are reflections of aggregation of
variance in populations, not individuals; thus, the expression of many genetic polymorphisms for
any given trait will show increasingly higher heritability rates across populations, which broaden
the possible functioning of each gene rather than narrowing our understanding of what each gene
actually does (Johnson, Penke, & Spinath, 2011, p. 256). Another reason that heritability is
misleading is that genetic factors alone do not properly incorporate the prominent role of
environment in determining phenotypic causality. Innovations in behavioral genetics are
discovering more and more that genes and environment both have significant contributions in the
development of phenotypes, and the assumption that genetics and environmental influences are
independent (the underlying assumption when determining heritability) is simply inaccurate
(Johnson et al, 2011, p. 258).
Kendler (2013) astutely illuminates that a stunning amount of traits are heritable, from
hours spent watching television (Plomin, Corley, DeFries, & Fulker, 1990) to church attendance
(Kendler & Meyers, 2009); thus, claims that heritability provides insight into biological causality
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of psychiatric disorders are an over-simplification. Rather, brains are wired from genetic
instructions, so essentially everything that makes up one’s brain is created from genetic
information. Kendler (2013) also remind us that “individual psychiatric disorders are clinicalhistorical constructs, not pathophysiological entities” (p.1059). As we have already noted, the
DSM and ICD diagnostic categories are constructs created to provide consensus among
clinicians and are not based in biology, which means they do not map on to any physiological
pathology. Therefore, approaching the biology of psychiatric disorders with the current
diagnostic categories might complicate, or worse prevent, discovering the biological etiology of
psychopathology.
The advent of molecular genetics has allowed scientists to study the structure and
function of specific genes. Hyman (1999) explains, “The goal of modern molecular genetics
research is to identify the genetic loci (a locus is literally a place in the genome, which may
range from a single DNA nucleotide to a deletion of a large chromosomal segment) that
contribute to a trait, such as vulnerability to a mental illness,” (p. 518). However, he goes on to
report, “…it appears that multiple alleles found at multiple loci within the genome interact to
produce vulnerability to a mental disorder” (Hyman, 1999, p. 518).
Complexity notwithstanding, there are two approaches that have been largely utilized in
determining genetic factors of psychopathology: linkage gene mapping and association studies.
“Linkage has highlighted specific chromosomal regions; association studies have suggested
specific genes implicated in the predisposition to, and protection from, addiction” (Ball, 2006, p.
448). In other words, linkage studies are concerned with where the implicated genes are located.
Association studies are concerned with which genes are implicated. The idea behind these
methods is that if the specific locations of genes or alleles that are involved in disorders are
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discovered, it will lead to a discovery of causality. Progress has been made with these
approaches, but once again the incredible complexity was not anticipated. Studies on alcoholism
produced genetic linkage to several chromosomal regions, and identified even more candidate
genes, which are discussed below.
Linkage studies for alcohol dependence showed possible connections to chromosomes 1,
2, and 7, with protective factors found on chromosome 4, and possible linkage to chromosome
16 (Reich et al., 1998, p. 211-213; Reich, Culverhouse, & Beirut, 1999, p. 600). Since these
studies were conducted, the use of wider genome scan availability has led to the identification of
41 chromosomal regions that may contribute to polysubstance use vulnerability (Kreek, Nielsen
& LaForge, 2004, p. 88). The vast number of possible loci for specific genes in a given disorder,
coupled with the lack of sensitivity to smaller effects of important genes in a given disorder,
have left a lot to be desired from linkage study results (Ball, 2008, p.364). Linkage studies have
proven disappointing in the quest for discovering the pathophysiology of complex disorders
because “the effects of the underlying genes are not strong enough to be detected by
linkage…Therefore, genome-wide association studies have been offered as a more powerful
approach” (Merikangas & Risch, 2003, p. 626).
Association studies, however, have implicated at least 1,500 genes affiliated with risk for
substance abuse (Urbanoski & Kelly, 2012, p. 62). Kreek, Nielsen, and LaForge (2004) highlight
a few selected genes that are involved in susceptibility to addiction, some of which are drug
specific (i.e. alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) in alcoholism, kappa and delta opioid receptors in
opiate addiction) while others within the dopamine, serotonin, and GABA systems have shown
to be involved in addiction across several different substances, as well as in polysubstance
addiction (for review see Kreek, Nielsen & LaForge, 2004). It is well established that these
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systems are also implemented in a wide range of psychiatric disorders, implying risk genes most
likely overlap between substances use disorders and co-morbid psychiatric diagnoses.
In just one example, a study using data from the Psychiatric Genetics Consortium
determined shared genetic etiology across five psychiatric disorders, with significant correlations
between schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, autism spectrum disorders
(ASD) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Lee, Ripke, Neale, Faraone,
Purcell,….Asherson, 2013, p. 989). As we can see, though the findings of association studies
have been promising, they still cast too wide a net to provide specific, accurate detection of the
underlying biology of any of the complex psychiatric disorders mentioned. Moreover, we must
remember that genes are not the only factors that contribute to psychopathology.
The complex interplay between genes and environment is of particular importance in
psychiatric disorders. Kremen, Panizzo, and Cannon (2016) highlight the difference between two
different phenomena: gene-environment correlation and gene-environment interaction (p. 3).
Gene-environment correlation is where one’s genotype will influence the environment they
inhabit, and these effects can be passive, evocative, or active (Kremen, Panizzo, & Cannon,
2016, p. 3). This is especially important for externalizing psychiatric disorders, such as substance
use disorder, in which individuals shape their own environments often leading to undesirable
behavior. Gene-environment interaction, however, refers to the phenomena whereby a person’s
response to environmental factors will influence genetic expression (or mutability) based on their
genotype (Kremen, Panizzon, & Cannon, 2016, p. 3).
Glatt, Montalvo-Ortiz, Gelertner, Hudziak, and Kaufman (2016) discuss geneenvironment interaction and their involvement in stress-related disorders citing that maltreated
children are at risk for a host of psychiatric illnesses such as major depression, post-traumatic
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stress disorder, anxiety disorders, aggressive behavior, and substance abuse (p. 81). Glatt et al.
(2016) also state that each candidate gene associated with stress-related disorders were also
associated with a variety of phenotypic traits, emphasizing the pleiotropic effects of a number of
risk genes for several psychiatric disorders, which can lead to exacerbated comorbidity diagnoses
(p. 82). Glatt et al. are therefore enthusiastic supporters of the RDoC efforts to study specific
clinical phenotypes, rather that multifaceted clinical syndromes (p. 87).
Building upon the concept of the interplay between genes and environment, Glatt et al.
(2016) also turn their attention to the field of epigenetics. The term epigenetics refers to “changes
in the genetic material that leads to phenotypic changes without altering the DNA sequence”
which include DNA methylation and modifications to the DNA packaging material, chromatin
(Umesh & Haque Nizamie, 2014, p. 124). Methylation in the promoter region of a candidate
gene is associated with gene silencing, and is directly affected by environmental exposure to
things like trauma and early life stress; moreover, 97% of epigenetic functioning occurs in the
intergenic regions and between gene bodies which can affect transcription binding sites that
influence gene expression close and far from the epigenetic activity (Glatt et al. 2016, p. 85).
Furthermore, epigenetic mechanisms such as DNA methylation and histone modification have
been associated with brain regions that are implemented in many stress-related psychiatric
disorders, such as the ventral tegmental area, nucleus accumbens, and the hippocampus (Glatt et
al, 2016, p. 85, 86).
Revolutionary research done by Meaney and colleagues (2004) showed that “maternal
behavior (licking, grooming, etc.) could produce stable alterations of DNA methylation and
chromatin structure, providing a mechanism for the long-term effects of early adversity on gene
expression in the offspring” of rats (Weaver et al., 2004). In other words, exposure to
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environmental stress (maternal neglect, for example) in the early life of offspring actually
changed the biological expression of genes in the offspring of rats, and these changes persisted
into adulthood. Studying epigenetic mechanisms, then, could possibly help bridge the gap
between environmental risks and biological pathophysiological risks for psychiatric disorders
(El-Sayed, Koenen, & Galea, 2013, p. 610).
Epigenetics is particularly meaningful for substance abuse disorders, since long-term use
of psychoactive drugs is known to affect neuronal structures and functions of certain brain
regions (McQuown & Wood, 2010, p. 145). Moreover, epigenetic factors may influence the
initiation of drug seeking behaviors. In other words, epigenetic changes highly influence
addictive behavior, and addictive behaviors influence epigenetic changes, thus it is an important
area for researching substance use disorder. The following section will highlight two
transcription factors that are prime targets research due to their prominent role in addiction
pathology. Without the field of epigenetics, these contributing factors to addictive behaviors
might have been overlooked.
In an exemplary review of epigenetic mechanisms in addiction, McQuown and Wood
(2010) elucidate the role of two important transcription factors: ΔFosB and cyclic adenosine
monophosphate response element–binding (CREB) protein. CREB is induced rapidly after drug
exposure, then returns to baseline after a few hours, while ΔFosB accumulates slowly after drug
each drug exposure, and remains highly stable for months after cessation; both are shown to
mediate distinct aspects of drug addiction (McQuown & Wood, 2010, p.147). Studies conducted
on rodents show activation of CREB “leads to a negative state of decreased reward and increased
drug tolerance and dependence”; furthermore, rodents with decreased CREB showed more
sensitization to cocaine and cocaine-related cues (McQuown & Wood, 2010, p. 148).
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Conversely, ΔFosB is shown to increase drug-induced locomotion, drug sensitization, and
motivation for self-administration (McQuown & Wood, 2010, p. 148).
McQuown and Wood (2010) also explain that drugs of abuse enhance histone acetylation
(HDAC) activity, where cocaine self-administering rats had increased histone acetylation, which
increases drug intake (p. 150). Most interesting of all, HDAC inhibitors are shown to enhance
synaptic plasticity and long-term memory, by consolidating learning events into long-term
memory formation, when otherwise the formation of long-term memories would not occur;
moreover, such memories outlast the longevity of normally formed long-term memories
(McQuown & Wood, 2010, p. 151). So, epigenetic effects might be the cause of, or at least
contribute to, some of the abnormal learning processes seen in the cycle of drug addiction.
Addicts that have learned to assign value to drugs and other stimuli related to drugs of abuse may
have formed these memories with the assistance of these epigenetic changes.
Because of its role in learning and memory, HDAC has been a target for novel drug
therapies in fear-related disorders such as anxiety and PTSD, with striking results on fearextinction learning in preclinical translational research (Whittle & Singewald, 2014, p. 570). In
regards to substance abuse, the application of HDAC inhibitors could facilitate a reduction of
relapse behaviors due to increasing the extinction of learned behaviors associated with drug use
and drug-seeking; these changes would also persist over longer periods of time than behavioral
re-learning alone. Studies have also shown that chronic administration of HDAC inhibitors have
an antidepressant effect on rodents (Fuchikami, Yamamoto, Okada, Yamawaki, & Yamawaki,
2016, p. 322). These epigenetic mechanisms have vast implications for clinical utility that are
applicable for more than just substance abuse disorders, as seen in a review by Tsankova et al.
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(2007) on the epigenetic effects of several psychiatric disorders such as depression and
schizophrenia.
Since the complexity of psychiatric disorders is no longer underestimated, there are some
exciting research prospects ahead. Genetic research efforts should continue to focus on new
avenues based on innovations in the field of psychiatric and behavioral genetics, such as geneenvironment interactions and epigenetics. However, without a clear gene-to-disorder pathway, as
in the case of Mendelian disorders, researchers suggest looking at psychiatric disorder biology
not as direct etiological pathways, but as intricate networks (Miller & Rockstroh, 2013, p. 180).
Therefore, the first priority in these continued efforts will be to redefine phenotypes of interest
during research, rather than attempting to prove biological causality of existing psychiatric
diagnoses. By evading heterogeneous symptom clusters, researchers will be able to study
specific targets, which is precisely the goal of the RDoC matrix.
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Chapter 3- Endophenotypes

It is becoming clear that it is incredibly difficult, perhaps impossible, to find genes that
“code for” psychiatric illness. The hope of finding simple Mendelian casual pathways for
psychopathology is a distant memory. The brain is far too complex an organ to be able to trace a
disorder from an observable symptom, down a biological linkage chain, to a single point of
origin. Psychiatric disorders are multifactorial and polygenetic. Moreover, because one’s
environment and genome shift over time, how a person’s genome is operationalized is a moving
target (Miller, Clayson, & Yee, 2014, p. 1329). Realizing the difficulty of this endeavor, the
search continues for alternative ways of researching psychopathology without merely attempting
to match specific genes to broad, complex symptom clusters.
While studying schizophrenia in the 1970’s, Gottesman and Shields (1973) realized that
instead of trying to connect complex behavioral symptoms with individual genes, it would be
beneficial if they could identify an intermediate target that was easier to measure, but involved
both the schizophrenic genotype and phenotype (p. 15). Gottesman and Shields proposed
“endophenotypes as a vital link in discovering and understanding genetic contributions to
psychopathology” (Miller & Rockstroh, 2013, p. 178).
The endophenotype concept lay dormant for decades, until an invited review by
Gottesman and Gould (2003) increased attention for this crucial theory due to growing
disillusionment with the DSM and ICD, and now momentum is rallying behind the
endophenotype concept and dimensional constructs of psychopathology that integrate
psychological and biological phenomena like the RDoC initiative (Miller & Rockstroh, 2013,
178-179).
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Essentially, endophenotypes are ways of reducing complex phenotypes into more
feasible ways of measuring them. Gottesman and Gould (2003) conceptualize endophenotypes as
“measurable components unseen by the unaided eye along the pathway between disease and
distal genotype” (Gottesman & Gould, 2003, p. 636). The idea is that endophenotypes will be
“more defined and quantifiable measures that are envisioned to involve fewer genes, fewer
interacting levels and ultimately activation of a single set of neuronal circuits” (Gould &
Gottesman, 2006, p. 115). Though these claims have been challenged by many researchers who
suggest that endophenotypes are no less genetically complex than clinical psychiatric diagnoses,
many remain who are optimistic about their potential as alternatives, to add to the growing “big
data” collection efforts, and to improve the current methods of genetic research (Cuthbert, 2014,
p. 1206).
Conceptually, an endophenotype suggests that there is an internal deviation in processing
in those with mental illness. Indeed, “endo” (from the Greek “within”) eludes to inner
disturbances, perhaps before external symptoms even begin to manifest (Lenzenweger, 2013, p.
1351). At the time when this was suggested, these concepts were “hidden” within the individual
and simply assumed or inferred by the researcher. Luckily, many of these theoretical constructs
can now be evaluated with 21st century technological tools.
Most endophenotypes cited in the psychiatric literature thus far are neuroimaging,
electrophysiological, and cognitive variables (Glahn et al., 2014, p. 123). However,
endophenotypes could potentially be any type of measurement, from neurophysiological,
biochemical, endocrine, neuroanatomical, cognitive or neuropsychologica l (Gould & Gottesman,
2006, p. 114). The criteria set forth for a biological marker to qualify as an endophenotype
include qualities such as it should be associated with the illness, and found in higher rates of
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unaffected relatives of affected individuals than in the general population; furthermore, the
marker should be heritable indicating a genetic contribution (Dick et al., 2006, p. 113).
Though the use of endophenotypes has been mostly applied in schizophrenia research,
there have been several studies on substance abuse and alcoholism where endophenotypes were
employed. One such study used electrophysiological endophenotypes to measure genetic
predisposition to alcoholism. Abnormalities in the central nervous system (CNS) have been
shown to be a marker for those susceptible to alcoholism as well as other externalizing disorders,
and also among their relatives, which can be seen in the human electroencephalogram (EEG),
with event-related potentials (ERPs) such as the P300 response (Begleiter & Porjesz, 1999, p.
1130). Event-related potentials can be explained as the measurement of electrical activity of
neural networks in response to a stimulus, and the P300 is a positive wave that reflects the time
(in milliseconds) in which the subject detects the stimulus (Landa, Krpoun, Kolarova, &
Kasparek, 2014, p. 17, 18). Reduced P300 amplitude, which can reflect cognitive decline and
brain dysfunction, is associated with the risk for alcoholism and other psychiatric disorders
(Rangaswamy et al., 2004, p. 245). Differences in the P300 signify that a dysfunctional
frontoparietal circuit may be responsible for the reduced P300 found in subjects at high risk for
alcoholism (Dick et al., 2006, p. 113). Increased beta wave power (which is associated with
anxious thinking) in the EEG bands has been reported at higher levels at resting state among
alcoholics compared with controls, and has also been observed in the offspring of male
alcoholics; moreover, it is also highly heritable, with heritability estimates of 86%
(Beijsterveildt, Geus, Boomsma, 1996, p. 568).
Dick et al. (2006) used the beta wave frequency and the known chromosomal regions of
potential candidate genes for alcoholism to attempt to provide linkage evidence for this disorder.
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Using a multidisciplinary program called COGA, they compared peaks in the EEG recordings
and genetics analyses and found significant linkage peaks with the ERPs; this technique
successfully led to the identification of correlations between endophenotypic markers and
GABRA2 and CHRM2 as genes associated with alcohol dependence (Dick et al., 2006, p. 123).
Dick et. al. point out that alcohol dependence diagnoses had previously placed susceptibility at
chromosomes 4 and 7, where these genes can be found, but never so narrow as to locate these
genes specifically, until using the electrophysiological measures used here. The genes
implemented are summarized below.
The GABRA2 gene is located within a tight cluster of GABAA receptor genes on
chromosome 4p; GABA is involved in many of the behavioral effects of alcohol including motor
incoordination, sedation, ethanol preference, and withdrawal signs (Dick et al., 2006, p. 117).
GABA is believed to play a role in CNS disinhibition related to the predisposition to alcoholism,
and thought to be involved in the beta brain rhythms measured by the EEG (Dick et al., 2006, p.
117).
The CHRM2 gene is a muscarinic cholinergic receptor gene, which influences the effects
of acetylcholine on the central and peripheral nervous system; therefore they are thought to have
a direct influence on the P300 generation (Dick et al., 2006, p. 119). They are also thought to
have a role in cognition and memory, and recently, significant deficits in behavioral flexibility,
working memory, and hippocampal plasticity were observed in CHRM2 knockout mice (Dick et
al., 2006, p. 119). Dick et al. (2006) also reported an association between the CHRM2 gene in
alcohol and major depression, which is often a comorbid diagnosis (p. 121).
Another proposed endophenotype cited in the psychiatric literature is impulsivity. This
construct is heritable and multifaceted, including tendencies for poorly planned, premature and
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risky actions (Belin, Belin-Rauscent, Everitt, & Dalley, 2016, p.79). Impulsivity has been
implemented in a host of psychiatric disorders, such as ADHD, conduct disorders, pathological
gambling, intermittent explosive disorder and substance abuse. Not only can its symptoms
manifest in the context of disorders such as ADHD, schizophrenia, or depression, but the lack of
self-regulation in reward-related behaviors seen in drug addiction is directly affected by this
construct (Belin et al., 2016, p. 79). Impulsivity’s generalizability highlights the practicality and
importance of researching it as an endophenotype (Jonas & Markon, 2014, p. 661).
Ersche, Turton, Pradhan, Bullmore, and Robbins (2010) compared the personality traits
of impulsivity and sensation-seeking, both of which are largely prevalent as risk factors for, and
consequences of, drug addiction between drug users and their non-affected siblings. Studies of
drug addiction have shown that decreased inhibitory control can lead to the out-of-control drug
seeking behavior seen in addiction. Desensitized response to natural rewards has been shown to
lead to risky behaviors such as drug taking (Ersche et. al, 2010, p. 770). Ersche et al. (2010)
surmised that impulsivity and sensation-seeking may be viable endophenotypes for a genetic
predisposition to drug addiction.
The results of Ersche, Turton, Pradhan, Bullmore, and Robbins (2010) study confirmed
their assumptions: both drug users and their siblings reported significantly higher traitimpulsivity than their control counterparts, with drug users more impulsive than their siblings (p.
771). For sensation-seeking, drug users reported significantly higher desire for sensation than
their siblings and the controls, with no significant differences between the other two groups
(Ersche et al., 2010, p. 772). Ersche et al. (2010) found that impulsivity could possibly be an
endophenotype for addiction, a predisposition in brain circuitry long before one ever touches a
drug. Long term drug use involves neuroadaptive changes in large scale striato-thalamo-
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orbitofrontal networks implemented in natural reward processing and behavior regulation, which
may exacerbate a biological predisposition to impulsivity (Ersche et al., 2010, p. 772). Though
sensation-seeking did not prove to be an endophenotype in this study, it does not rule out its
presence in the initiation in drug seeking, and perhaps served as a protective factor in the siblings
that did not pass the threshold into substance use or abuse (Ersche et al., 2010, p. 772).
The endophenotype concept is incredibly valuable for research into psychopathology. To
break down complex behaviors that overlap diagnostic categories and study them across
interdisciplinary levels will no doubt provide greater depth of understanding into the tangled
webs of psychiatric illnesses. However, this teasing out of complex phenomena can also aid in
researching single complex phenomena.
As one example, Ray, Bujarski, and Roche (2016) suggest initial subjective response to
alcohol as a predictive endophenotype for alcohol dependence. The behavioral and
pharmacological effects of alcohol are dichotomously dispersed between stimulant and sedative
effects; when blood alcohol levels are rising, alcohol produces intensely stimulating, rewarding
effects and when blood alcohol levels are declining, sedative and unpleasant effects are felt (p.
8). Importantly, as seen in several studies, both recent and over decades, those with a family
history of alcohol abuse are more sensitive to the rewarding effects of alcohol, and less sensitive
to the negative effects (Ray, Bujarski, & Roche, 2016, p. 8).
For the treatment of alcoholism, a few medications have been approved by the FDA to
supplement attempts to terminate addictive behaviors, including nalmafene, acamprosate, and
naltrexone; yet the most efficacious of these medications are sometimes only effective for 30%
of the individuals who take them (Helton & Lohoff, 2015, p. 122; Ray, Bujarski, & Roche, 2016,
p. 12). Ray et al. (2016) point out, however, that in genetic studies on the subjective response of
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alcohol, even though they implemented well-known genes related to alcohol (including the
aforementioned GABRA2), studies focused specifically on the stimulating subjective effects of
alcohol found differences in the carriers of a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) in the mu
opioid receptor gene (OPMR1) called the Asn40Asp SNP (p. 10). Carriers of the Asp40 showed
varying tandem repeats of the dopamine transporter gene (SLC6A3), which has been shown in
behavioral and neuroimaging studies to respond to naltrexone (Ray et al., 2016, p. 10). In another
study, carriers of the Asp40 who were treated with naltrexone were less likely to relapse than
those with the Asn40 allele, showed longer periods of abstinence if they did go back to relapse,
and drank less when they resumed drinking than the Asn40 group, as well (Helton & Loff, 2015,
p. 124). Interestingly, Asp40 carriers reported greater subjective experiences of alcohol effects
and self-administered more alcohol than their Asn40 counterparts, both in the laboratory and
naturalistic settings, yet this subjective response was not reported when alcohol was administered
intravenously (Ray et al., 2016, p. 10). This discovery has large implications regarding the ability
to predict the effectiveness of naltrexone, and other pharmacological treatments, based on
personalized medicine (Ray et al., 2016, p. 10).
Ray, Bujarski, and Roche (2016) poignantly address the urgency and practicality of a
framework like the RDoC to increase consilience across studies. In their article, Ray et al. (2016)
highlight the single endophenotype of subjective response to alcohol that spans a breadth of
studies across many units of analysis. Moreover, they highlight many other factors that this one
concept encompasses not expressly covered in this review, such as administration methods,
clinical vs subclinical populations, and stages of progression of alcohol consumption: light vs
heavy drinkers, heavy drinkers vs alcohol-dependent drinkers, early-stage alcoholism vs. late-
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stage alcoholism, etc., as well as reviews of other genetic and imaging studies and suggestions
for future research (Ray et a., 2016, p. 12).
The relationship between biology and psychology, genes and environment, nature versus
nurture, is one of the most fundamental issues in the history of psychology. Scientists, however,
must acknowledge the equally important contribution of both genes and environment, in much
more complex ways than even once imagined. Miller and Rockstroh (2013) explain that the
notion of a causal chain has been misleading, as demonstrated by progress in such fields as
epigenetics, which is why a network model and Cuthbert’s assertion of “brain circuit disorders”
are more appropriate (pp. 178-203).
The benefit of the endophenotype concept--the use of intermediary markers of
maladaptive phenotypes that will aid in the identification of the genes that contribute to those
phenotypes--in psychopathology research. The greatest strength of the endophenotype approach
is that is dimensional; it does not limit itself to strictly clinical populations and it transcends
categorical diagnostic boundaries, which is also a defining feature of the RDoC matrix (Miller &
Rockstroh, 2013, p. 202).
Understanding how the brain works is still in its infancy, and as such, researchers must
broaden their scope of researching the brain’s processing capabilities by viewing not just isolated
sections, but whole network processes at a time, both functional and dysfunctional. The next
section will examine one of these circuits, the brain’s reward system.
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Chapter 4- Reward Systems

Neural circuitry is arguably one of the most important concepts in understanding human
behavior. The human brain is made up of trillions of cells, all interconnected into a vast network.
The circuits that connect these cells are the way this network communica tes within itself to
produce the perception of the world. The field of neuroscience, together with many other
disciplines, is beginning to investigate how these processes work. Subsequently, the field of
mental health is concerned with pinpointing when these processes begin to function abnormally.
This is a grand undertaking, and the NIMH is not taking it lightly. When organizing the
RDoC matrix, the workgroups assigned to create the domains had two requirements that
constructs in the matrix must meet: they must be valid, as evidenced by many studies from many
different laboratories, and they must show previous evidence of linkage to a neural circuit or
system (Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016, p. 289). As covered earlier, the workgroups settled on five
domains: positive valence systems, negative valence systems, cognitive systems, systems for
social processes, and arousal/modulatory systems, each with corresponding sub-constructs to
further elaborate on each domain (Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016, p. 289). The positive valence system
domain for reward circuitry, because of the well-known relevance of reward in drug addiction,
will be the focus of this chapter. Following this, a demonstration of how reward circuitry can be
studied across multiple diagnostic boundaries will be presented.
Substance use disorder
Addiction is characterized by the transition from voluntary, impulsive drug consumption
to compulsive, habitual substance abuse and the inability to limit intake even in the face of
negative consequences (Koob & Volkow, 2010, p. 217). Koob & Volkow (2010) also point out
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the severely negative affective state that results when access to the drug is prevented; these
stages are classified as 1) Binge/Intoxication 2) Withdrawal/Negative affect 3)
Preoccupation/Anticipation (p. 217, 219).
When it comes to drug addiction, “reward” is the beginning of the end. Many addicted
individuals report no longer feeling pleasure from using drugs; it is no longer a choice for them,
it is a need. The shift from cognitively- informed behavioral choices to habit-based, sensorydriven behaviors reflects the progressive dysfunction of the interconnected reward and
motivation/control circuits that become increasingly deficient as addiction continues (Karoly,
YorkWilliams, & Hutchinson, 2015, p.2074). Once substance use progresses into addiction, the
dysfunction of other neural circuits become more pronounced, such as the fear circuits during
acute and sustained threat. It is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate further into these
domains, but further research into substance abuse across the constructs of the RDoC matrix
would be warranted.
Reward
The brain’s “reward circuit” has been a central focus of research for decades. Any
number of stimuli can be rewarding and reinforcing for humans and animals, and therefore elicits
motivation to seek continued consumption of the reward, which in turn allows the organism to
learn to assign value to the stimulus and prioritize what resources to devote to obtaining the
reward (Hyman, Malenka, & Nestler, 2006, p. 567). This circuit, and its dysfunction, has been
found to be associated with many psychiatric disorders, including schizophrenia, obsessivecompulsive disorder, autism, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression, and substance
abuse (Pujara & Koenigs, 2014, p. 82).
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The discovery of the brain responding to reward can be traced back to Olds and Milner
(1954), who realized rats would repeat behaviors that elicited electrical stimulation of electrodes
placed on certain brain areas because the rats found the effects to be pleasurable (Pujara &
Koenigs, 2014, p. 82). This subjective feeling of pleasure experienced by the rats is what most
people attribute to the term “reward”. In reality though, this hedonic experience is but one
component of reward. Scientific progress has since delineated three dissociable components of
reward: “liking” (hedonic impact); “wanting” (incentive salience); and learning (predictive
associations), all of which have their own underlying neural circuitry and differ in their
psychological and biological functioning (Berridge, Robinson & Aldridge, 2009; BaskinSommers & Foti, 2015, p. 228). “Liking” refers to the hedonic response to reward and is
generally, but not always, associated with an experience of subjective pleasure (Baskin-Sommers
& Foti, 2015, p. 228). “Wanting” refers to the motivation of approach toward, and consumption
of, rewards (Berridge et al., 2009, p. 68). Learning is the ability to build knowledge about
specific relationships between cues, behaviors, and reward outcomes (Baskin-Sommers et al.,
2015, p. 229). Learning processes are varied and complex; associative learning usually refers to
Pavlovian or instrumental conditioning which typically results in procedural (habitual)
responses, while cognitive learning refers to the knowledge obtained by an individual and
generally results in declarative (conscious) responses (Berridge & Robbinson, 2003, p. 507).
Though these processes are dissociable, they function as part of an interactive network;
sometimes these circuits work together, sometimes they contend with one another, and at times
they are expressed implicitly beneath the conscious awareness of the individual (Berridge et al.,
2003, p. 508).
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The disentanglement of reward components has fascinating ramifications. It is often
assumed that what one likes, one wants—and vice versa, yet neuroscience has determined that
they do not occur as simultaneously as once believed. If “liking” typically represents the
subjective feeling of pleasure or euphoria one experiences from a reward, then “wanting” can be
described as the component of the reward that makes the reward attractive and desirable to the
individual—thus “wanting” is motivational rather than emotional (Berridge & Robinson, 2003,
p. 510). So, for a person addicted to drugs, it is highly plausible that they can report not “liking”
the drug, but still “wanting” to use drugs. The term “incentive salience” is used to describe this
component because of its descriptive nature of the function of “wanting”, since it has both
perceptual and motivational value, and that value is evidenced by the effort willing to be put
forth by the animal in order to obtain the reward (Berridge & Robinson, 1998, p. 313). An
addicted individual has ascribed motivational value to the drug of abuse, therefore the abnormal
desire they feel toward that drug has nothing to do with “liking”, but with an abnormal or
dysfunctional attribution of incentive salience.
The studies done by Berridge, Robinson, and Alridge (2009) highlight the separate
components of the reward and their independent functioning. Berridge and his colleagues sought
to isolate areas of a specific brain structure that elicits a “liking” response in rodents; for
example, they injected a mu opioid agonist in a small region of the nucleus accumbens (NAc)
suspected to increase the “liking” response, to which the subsequent “liking” reaction to sucrose
was tripled (p. 66). That same microinjection produced a double increase in the “wanting”
response as well, shown by the stimulation in eating behavior and amount of food intake by the
rodents (Berridge et al., 2009, p. 66). Berridge et al. named these small areas “hedonic hotspots”,
because outside of these “hotspots”, the same injections, even in the same brain structures,
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showed no increase in the “liking” response, though it maintained the increase in the “wanting”
response (p. 66). This shows the dissociable nature of these two components. They found similar
results for an overlapping endocannabinoid “hedonic hotspot” in the NAc, which is a
substructure of the ventral striatum (VS), activated by a different substance called anandamide,
that more than double both the “liking” and “wanting” responses (Berridge et al., 2009, p. 67).
This result has interesting implications for the pharmacological endocannabinoid antagonists for
treating obesity and addiction; because of the role of endocannabinoids in appetite and craving,
as well as increasing fatty tissue storage, and lab studies conducted to block the activation of this
system were shown to reduce these effects, making this system a model target for drug therapies
(Kirkham, 2008, p. 1100).
To display the separate role of “liking” and “wanting” further, in a study by Lamb et al.
(1991), the reinforcing effects of morphine were measured and shown to increase selfadministration, even at very small doses, before ever reaching the threshold for self-reported
“euphoric”, drug-liking experiences; the self-administration of the placebo, however, dropped
markedly after a few sessions. The study determined the best predictor of increased selfadministration was discovered to be the physiological pupil constriction the morphine solution
produced, more so than the subjective experience of pleasure (Lamb et al., 1991, p. 1169). This
study concluded that even though the addicted individuals reported no pleasure from the
injections of morphine, they were still willing to work by pressing a lever to self-administer very
small doses of morphine as compared to a saline injection, thus still responding to the reinforcing
effects of the incentive salience ascribed to the drug, without feeling the pleasurable effects
(Lamb et. al, 1991).
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The division of these two components of reward led to one of the most sensational
discoveries about the neurochemical understanding of our pleasure system—the function of the
neurotransmitter dopamine. When it comes to reward, the mesolimbic dopamine system has been
the central focus of research. Wise (1980) was the first to postulate the “dopamine
hedonia/pleasure hypothesis”, to which other researchers built upon, even coining the loss of
pleasure the alternative “dopamine anhedonia hypothesis”. It was well understood that
dopaminergic projections were the cause of the subjective experience of pleasure.
When it comes to drug addiction, there is a clear relation between the rewarding effects
of drugs of abuse and the continued self-administration of these substances. Most studies
investigating drugs of abuse find that the experience of drug-induced pleasure is due to the
release of dopamine in the VS, (Franken, Booij, & van den Brink, 2005, p. 200). The mesolimbic
dopamine pathway, which involves dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area
(VTA) into the NAc, is a crucial pathway in drug reward (Volkow, Wang, Fowler, Tornasi, &
Telang, 2011, p. 1503).
However, contributing to the “liking” aspect of rewards may not be dopamine’s most
prominent role, after all. Berridge and Kringelbach (2015) point to translational research done on
rats that shows even almost complete destruction of mesolimbic dopamine neurons, reduced to
1% of normal levels by neurotoxic lesions, left all “liking” facial responses to sweet rewards
intact (p. 656). Similarly, patients with severe dopamine depletion due to Parkinson’s disease do
not show any sign of decreased “liking” responses to sweet tastes, in fact some actually show
increased pleasure responses to sweet foods (Meyers, Amick, & Friedman, 2010, p. 91). Thus,
the summary of these studies, and a large body of supporting literature, concludes that the
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function of dopamine is not a mechanism of the appetitive value of rewards, but of the “wanting”
aspect of reward (McClure, Daw & Montague, 2003, p. 423).
In addition to the abnormal processing of incentive salience, the dysfunction of many
other circuits are implemented in drug addiction, such as the mesostriatal and mesocortical
pathways--circuits involved in condition/habits, motivation, and executive functions such as
inhibitory control and decision making (Volkow, Wang, Fowler, Tomasi, & Telang, 2011, p.
15037). Reduced morphological volume of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), the area of the brain
responsible for higher order cognitive functioning, and decreased connectivity between the PFC
and subcortical structures such as the VS and amygdala—both of which lead to altered learning
and deficient behavioral control--are among the most consistent neuroimaging findings in
patients with substance abuse disorders (Baskin-Sommers & Foti, 2015, p. 231).
Both animal and human studies have shown lack of adaptive association learning in
reward-related tasks for substance-dependent subjects. Rats with lesions in the NAc showed
preference for smaller, immediate rewards rather than larger, delayed rewards which suggests the
NAc must be intact for discrimination learning (Wilson, Sayette, Fiez, 2004; Pujara & Koenigs,
2014, p. 85). Volkow, Fowler, and Wang (2003) explain that surges of dopamine by drugs of
abuse result in changes in brain functioning to increase the motivational salience of drug-related
stimuli and decreases sensitivity to natural reinforcers, essentially causing an anhedonic response
similar to that seen in major depressive disorder and schizophrenia (p. 1447). This results in a
hypoactivation of the memory and prefrontal control circuits, resulting in impaired learning.
Disruptions in the prefrontal cortex can be seen by neuroimaging studies during drug-related,
cue-reactivity tasks confirming the impairments in cognitive abilities of drug addicted
individuals (Wilson, Sayette, Fiez, 2004).
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Now that we have established how the reward components of liking, wanting and
learning are disordered in substance abuse disorder, we will discuss a study that displays the
effects of how a dysfunctional reward system can manifest across diagnostic boundaries. Hägele
and colleagues (2015) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a monetary
incentive delay (MID) task to research disordered reward anticipation between a host of
psychiatric disorders, including alcohol dependence (AD), schizophrenia, major depressive
disorder (MDD), bipolar disorder (acute manic episode), attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), and healthy controls. They assumed that blunted ventral striatal activity would be most
pronounced in those illnesses with depressive symptoms, as evidenced by the drop in dopamine
projections known to occur in these states (Hägele et al., 2015, p. 332). As hypothesized, Hägele
et al. observed reduced right VS activation during reward anticipation in the schizophrenic
patients, AD patients, and patients with MDD, as compared to the healthy controls, but no
difference in those with symptoms of anxiety disorders (p. 339). It is the conclusion of this study
that reward expectation is significantly correlated with striatal dopamine projections, and the
dysfunction of learned reward-prediction/anticipation errors directly influences the severity of
depressive symptoms regardless of clinical diagnosis (Hägele et al., 2015). The similar
behavioral and neurobiological data obtained from the patients of this study confirm the presence
of comparable symptoms across a range of psychiatric diagnoses, substantiating the urgency for
a research framework such as the RDoC initiative.
In this section, the construct of reward to was highlighted to display the complexity of its
dysfunction in substance use disorder. The field of neuroscience must continue in its efforts to
tease apart the many components and contexts in which this and many other constructs function,
and at what point these processes begin to operate abnormally. The RDoC has begun this process
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by creating a framework that studies the disentangled elements of constructs such as reward, and
provides a large-scale, collaborative effort between different disciplines. This is the next step
toward innovative discoveries for treating mental illness and advancing toward an understanding
of human cognitive processing and behavior.
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Conclusion
This review presents the need to integrate neuroscience and translational research in the
treatment of psychopathology. Substance use disorder was used as a template, because it is
frequently co-diagnosed alongside other mental disorders in the mental health field, and it
progresses in stages from voluntary substance use to compulsive addiction, thus it is a useful
target for studying the biological underpinnings for psychopathology. Chapter 1 displayed the
shortcomings of the current classification system, and surveyed the intentions of the RDoC
research framework. Chapter 2 reviewed the limitations of the conventional methods for genetic
research into mental illness and highlighted the promising future of epigenetics in mental health.
In chapter 3, the possibility of using endophenotypes as research targets for psychiatric disorders,
rather than diagnostic categories, was discussed because they are believed to be more viable
options for discovering etiological causality at the genetic, molecular, and cellular levels.
Chapter 4 examined the reward system, and the dysfunction of this system that can occur in
substance use disorder and across diagnostic boundaries.
The goal of personalized medicine is to customize healthcare and tailor medical
decisions, procedures, and prognoses to the individual patient. The Precision Medicine Initiative,
Human Connectome Project, and now the Research Domain Criteria project, all point to the
dramatic paradigm shift in researching the etiology and pathophysiology of diseases and
disorders. Translational research incorporates aspects of both basic science and clinical research,
in order to connect fundamental research findings to people and practice in the real world clinical
setting. This translational research approach is the future of neuroscientific progress.
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This literature review was intended to some light on the state of our mental health care
treatment for individuals suffering from debilitating illnesses such as addiction, and the
devastating impact it can have on them, their families, and society at large. The colossal
breakthroughs in technology and traditional medicine have yet to graze the field of psychiatry
and mental illness; some disorders have not seen treatment improvement in over 50 years (Akil
et al., 2010, p. 1580). The shift toward integrating neuroscience and translational research in
psychopathology can change that. The RDoC is a huge step in that direction, and the NIMH and
other institutions such as the National Institute of Drug Abuse that have begun to implement
these types of research approaches in practice and are leading the way toward real progress for
this field. The utility of the translational approach is also being recognized at the educational
level. Emerging fields such as behavioral neuroscience and neuropsychology are already being
implemented, and will give burgeoning scientists and clinicians a wide curricula of knowledge
with which to draw in order to understand human behavior at multiple levels of processing.
The field of mental health has long been in need of a redirection, and initiatives such as
the RDoC are possibly the solution to the many problems encountered in the research and
treatment of psychiatric disorders. Researchers are optimistic for the future of the integration of
neuroscience in this field and are eager to see an increase of funding and positive results. It is
time to give those suffering from psychiatric disorders hope of a better outcome and new
successful treatment options that they are not only in desperate need of, but of which they are
rightly deserving of, as well.
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